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PROTECTING LOCAL AUTHORITY IN STATE
CONSTITUTIONS AND CHALLENGING INTRASTATE
PREEMPTION
Emily S. P. Baxter

ABSTRACT
In recent years, state legislatures have increasingly passed laws that prohibit or
preempt local action on a variety of issues, including fracking, LGBTQIA
nondiscrimination, and workplace protections, among others. Often, these
preemption laws are a direct response to action at the local level. States pass
preemption laws either directly before or directly after a locality passes an
ordinance on the same subject. Scholars have seen these preemptive moves as the
outcome of the urban disadvantage in state and national government due to
partisan gerrymandering.
Preemption may be a feature of our governing system, but it has also become a
problematic political tool state legislatures use to block the will of local
governments. This Note discusses the role of cities and localities within the
American republican system and proposes new ways to address preemption based
on a commitment to local governing autonomy, also known as home rule. State
constitutions and the guidelines courts use to interpret state constitutions offer an
opportunity to improve and secure the relationship between state and local
governments. The first Part of this Note addresses theories of local power, the
second Part surveys a broad range of sources and examples to understand the
scope of state preemption of local action, and the third Part critiques proposals to
address preemption while offering new ideas to further that effort focused on
amending state constitutions. Finally, the Appendix contains an original
qualitative analysis of states’ constitutional home rule provisions and statutes.
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INTRODUCTION
For supporters of worker-protective workplace policies, such as
paid sick days or a higher minimum wage, 2014 and 2015 were
game-changing years. An unprecedented number of cities passed
paid sick leave ordinances and minimum wage increases. 1 There
was a feeling that, while there might be legislative inertia at the
federal or state level, cities could act and prove that these workplace protections were effective, feasible, and forward-thinking.
But, as low-level economic policy researchers in Washington, D.C.,
my fellow think-tank denizens and I were quickly alerted to another growing pattern: state legislators were introducing preemptive

1. See, e.g., Paid Sick Time Legislative Successes, A BETTER BALANCE,
https://www.abetterbalance.org/resources/paid-sick-time-laws/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019);
14 Cities & States Approved $15 Minimum Wage in 2015, NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT
(Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.nelp.org/news-releases/14-cities-states-approved-15-minimumwage-in-2015/.
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bills to block these local actions as soon as they were passed or,
sometimes, days before city councils voted. We saw the pattern repeating in other areas, such as environmental ordinances, particularly local hydraulic fracturing (fracking) bans, and LGBTQIA antidiscrimination actions—most famously with North Carolina’s
2
“bathroom bill.” Working with my counterpart on the LGBT policy team, we learned that these preemptive moves were more than
just political power grabs. They also raised fundamental questions
about the functioning of American democracy at the state and local level. They challenged typical assumptions about the structure
of our government and its aspiration to balance power. We were
out of our depth.
Since then, some of the nation’s foremost scholars on local law
have taken on the effort to untangle the meaning, legal ramifications, and possible avenues for addressing state preemption of local action. A dominant view is that such preemptive action is the
result of a systematic urban disadvantage in representation at the
state and national level, leading to legislatures that are skewed toward the preferences of non-urban constituents and legislators that
3
may disagree with the actions of local governments. Accepting this
foundation, this Note seeks to broaden the universe of solutions
that may recalibrate intrastate preemption so that it is a more deliberate feature of state and local governance, rather than merely a
political opportunity. Given the difficulties of legal challenges to
intrastate preemption discussed in Part II.C, this Note focuses on
state constitutional and judicial reforms.
Part I of this Note explains the role that cities and localities play
in the American governing structure. It discusses differing theories
about the extent of local power and introduces preemption as a
feature of our system of representative democracy. Part II looks
more closely at the current problem: a recent wave of preemptive
state legislation in response to local action. Part III furthers efforts
to address the rise of state preemption by focusing on possible
amendments to state constitutional constructions of home rule. It
analyzes current proposals and then offers new changes to state
constitutions and judicial procedures. Finally, the Appendix provides a qualitative assessment and comparison of states’ home rule
provisions.

2. See, e.g., Amber Phillips, The Tumultuous History of North Carolina’s Bathroom Bill,
which is on Its Way to Repeal, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/19/the-tumultuous-recent-history-of-north-carolinas-bathroombill-which-could-be-repealed/?utm_term=.7310a08339da.
3. See discussion infra note 37.
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I. LOCAL AUTONOMY AND ITS CHALLENGES
Within the structure of American government, localities are
seen both as creatures of the state 4 and as independent governing
5
entities. There are benefits and disadvantages to each outlook.
State legislatures may have more expertise to analyze issues and
6
implement laws that affect a whole state. At the same time, localities are often made of discrete populations with specific governing
needs. They may be able to “try out” new policies that would be dif7
ficult to enact statewide. Despite—or because of—cities’ growing
8
economic and cultural power, discussed below, states have increasingly passed laws that specifically preempt local action on a broad
9
range of issues. In some instances, states passed preemption laws
just after or just before a particular city passes an ordinance, sug10
gesting reactionary state action. Part I situates this phenomenon
within the context of general principles about the role of local political subdivisions in the constellation of American government
and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of preemption.
A. Cities in the American System
Since the late nineteenth century, the baseline theory of the role
of cities in the American governing structure has been that cities
are creatures of the state. 11 The United States Constitution does
12
not mention local governments, and conceptions of American
federalism tend to focus on the relationship between the “dual
13
sovereignties” of the federal government and state government.
Following this line of thinking, states permitted localities to create
local governments in order to implement state goals and duties in
places that, at one time, were isolated from other metropolitan ar-

4. Matthew J. Parlow, Progressive Policy-Making on the Local Level: Rethinking Traditional
Notions of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 371, 372 n.7 (2008) (referencing
Judge John Dillon’s “Dillon’s Rule”); see, e.g., Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
5. See discussion infra note 18 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. Id.
8. This Note does not focus on the difference between city or urban governance and
other forms of local government, such as in rural areas or suburbs.
9. Nicole DuPuis et al., City Rights in an Era of Preemption: A State-by-State Analysis 2018
Update, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES 3 (2018), http://www.nlc.org/sites/default/files/201703/NLC-SML%20Preemption%20Report%202017-pages.pdf.
10. Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1165–66
(2018).
11. Parlow, supra note 4, at 372.
12. Id.
13. Rick Su, Intrastate Federalism, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 191, 211 (2016).
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eas or from the state legislature. 14 Until the late nineteenth century, local governments tended to operate under Dillon’s Rule, a
common-law principle that allowed cities and localities to take action only where the state had given them a specific grant of pow15
er.
Unlike Dillon’s Rule, “home rule” is the term used to describe
local governments’ ability to make policy and govern of their own
16
accord. The movement for home rule began in 1875 with a con17
stitutional amendment in Missouri, but its origins are often at18
tributed to Michigan Supreme Court Justice Thomas Cooley. In
14. Parlow, supra note 4, at 372.
15. Id. at 372 n.7, 383.
16. Richard Briffault et al., The Troubling Turn in State Preemption: The Assault on Progressive Cities and How Cities Can Respond, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. AND POL’Y 2-3 (2017) (citing
Paul A. Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1124 (2007)),
https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ACS_Issue_Brief__Preemption_0.pdf.
17. Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 2—Remedying the Urban Disadvantage
Through Federalism and Localism, 77 LA. L. REV. 1045, 1065 (2017). Under the 1875 constitution, “large cities” could adopt their own charters. MO. CONST. ART. IX § 16 (1875),
http://www.archive.org/stream/cu31924030493419/cu31924030493419_djvu.txt. The law
required that the local charters align with the state constitution and laws, and specially highlighted that the state legislature retained power over St. Louis, even if it had its own charter.
As one early commentator complained: “[h]ome rule in Missouri was unfortunately born
with serious congenital defects. . . . Taken at face value, this language would appear to indicate that what the state gave with one hand it took away with the other.” Henry J. Schmandt,
Municipal Home Rule in Missouri, 1953 WASH. U. L. Q. 385, 387 (1953),
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3603&context=law_lawrevie
w.
18. Justice Thomas Cooley expressed his ideas about local power in his opinion for the
Michigan Supreme Court’s 1871 case, People ex rel. Leroy v. Hurlbut:
The doctrine that within any general grant of legislative power by the constitution
there can be found authority thus to take from the people the management of
their local concerns, and the choice, directly or indirectly, of their local officers, if
practically asserted, would be somewhat startling to our people, and would be
likely to lead hereafter to a more careful scrutiny of the charters of government
framed by them, lest sometime, by an inadvertent use of words, they might be
found to have conferred upon some agency of their own, the legal authority to
take away their liberties altogether. . . . We have taken great pains to surround the
life, liberty, and property of the individual with guaranties, but we have not, as a
general thing, guarded local government with similar protections. We must assume either an intention that the legislative control should be constant and absolute, or, on the other hand, that there are certain fundamental principles in our
general framework of government, which are within the contemplation of the
people when they agree upon the written charter, subject to which the delegations of authority to the several departments of government have been made.
That this last is the case, appears to me too plain for serious controversy.
People ex rel. Leroy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 97–98 (Mich. 1871). According to Judge David
Barron, Cooley’s outlook was partially a product of the constitutional interpretation of Cooley’s era: “This organic approach to constitutionalism was typical of his time. . . . As a result,
Cooley’s defense of local governmental independence, although formally based in state law
norms, was rooted in a larger constitutional vision that he believed to be capable of generalization.” David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U.
PA. L. REV. 487, 511–12 (1999).
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the intervening century, most states have adopted a form of home
19
rule authority for localities. Some states have “legislative home
rule,” where local governments are granted broad authority to legislate on any subject “unless defined”—that is, prohibited—by the
20
state legislature. This type of home rule gives localities considera21
ble freedom to pass laws. Other states operate under a narrower
“imperio” home rule regime, where state legislatures grant localities
specific spheres of power, such as zoning or municipal develop22
ment. Neither legislative nor imperio home rule provides particularly strong protections from preemptive action by state legislatures, although many states’ home rule structure includes some
constitutional or legislative limits on the state legislature’s power,
23
as well. By Professor Davidson’s count, thirty-seven state constitutions require state legislation to be general, rather than of “local
24
concern.” As such, states are often prohibited from passing laws
specifically targeting a particular locality or a particular local ac25
tion. At least fifteen states limit—via state constitution or state supreme court interpretation of the state constitution—the ability of
26
the state legislature to “override certain local enactments.”
Given the potential for states to limit local action even where
home rule exists, a number of academics argue that home rule is
more nominal than substantive. By this view, home rule is not “an
27
identifiable sphere of local autonomy.” Instead, it is a “constellation of grants and limitations that ‘powerfully influence[] the ways
28
in which cities and suburbs act.’” Professor Stahl argues that
home rule did not transform cities and suburbs into autonomous
actors precisely because the “dividing line between local and state
19.
20.

Diller, supra note 17, at 1065.
Nestor Davidson, STATE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL CONSTRAINTS ON LOCAL
PREEMPTION LEGISLATION, LEGAL EFFORT TO ADDRESS PREEMPTION (LEAP) PROJECT (March
2017),
https://www.abetterbalance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/State-Substantiveand-Procedural-Restraints.pdf.
21. Schragger, supra note 10, at 1193.
22. Laurie Reynolds, Home Rule, Extraterritorial Impact, and the Region, 86 DENV. U. L.
REV. 1271, 1275–77 (2009). See also Richard Briffault et al., supra note 16, at 2 n.2 (describing the historical evolution of the types of home rule); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part
I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13–17 (1990).
23. See infra Part III.A.
24. Davidson, supra note 20 (“Roughly 37 states constitutions provide that legislation
must be general, as opposed to ‘special’ or ‘local.’ Although the jurisprudence is varied, it is
perhaps not too much of an oversimplification to say that a statute that relates to persons or
things as a class is a general law, while a statute which relates to particular persons or things
of a class is a special law. Similarly, a local law is a kind of special law, where the subject of
the law is a specific locality or group of localities singled out from the class of all localities.”
(citation removed))
25. Id.
26. Diller, supra note 17, at 1065.
27. Schragger, supra note 10, at 1193.
28. Id.
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affairs is extremely amorphous.”29 As definitions or political motivations change, states have passed laws and courts have interpreted
them, as well as the meaning of “local concern,” in ways that are
30
often deferential to state control. Moreover, different states have
different judicial tests for determining what is or is not a state concern. Given persuasive arguments on both sides, Stahl notes that
courts are hesitant to sacrifice “statewide uniformity” and “com31
promise states’ police powers.”
When courts do take a stance on local versus statewide concern,
decisions often fall along a public-sphere versus private-sphere divide: Courts tend to relegate local power to the realm of “home
and family” or “associational” concerns rather than “regulation of
32
the market.” Issues such as education, housing, or land use are
often found to be local concerns, while regulation of “commercial
and other market actors,” including issues involving worker and
workplace protections or environmental regulations affecting
33
businesses, are held to require statewide uniformity. This may
suggest an anti-urban bias in courts’ and legislatures’ view of home
34
rule.
B. The Contested Role of Cities and Localities
The proper allocation of city and local power is a more controversial debate today than it has been in decades. Many large cities
wield social, economic, and political power far greater than the
35
Founders may have imagined. Disputes and disagreements arise
for a number of reasons, including the fact, as Professor Schragger
argues, that city boundaries are based on an “identifiable constituency,” whereas state boundaries are more arbitrary and based on
36
history and geography. Cities may be in a better position to make

29. Kenneth A. Stahl, Preemption, Federalism, and Local Democracy, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
133, 171 (2017).
30. See infra notes 119–23, 144–45 and accompanying text.
31. Stahl, supra note 29, at 171.
32. Schragger, supra note 10, at 1194–95.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1193–95. Professor Schragger explains that local grants of power are “more
readily enjoyed by suburban jurisdictions and easily effaced when locals seek to regulate
powerful commercial and financial actors.” This idea grows out of Barron’s argument that
zoning and land use issues invoking home rule often come from “suburban power” trying to
“protect property values.” Id. at 1193–94.
35. See Parlow, supra note 4, at 372–73.
36. Schragger, supra note 10, at 1185.
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effective policy because their constituents are more likely to be
37
bound by shared experiences, concerns, and needs.
There are competing perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of local governance: On one hand, the ability of economically and politically powerful localities to experiment with and implement tailored policies can be seen as an important opportunity
to improve Americans’ lives. Cities can serve as “laboratories of innovation,” and strong local power allows local governments to ad38
dress concerns that might differ from other parts of their state.
Local governments can be more responsive to constituents because
both the governments and constituencies are smaller (that is,
made of fewer people); members of communities may have more
access to their elected officials and greater opportunity to be civi39
cally involved. Policy innovations that may not be feasible or politically possible at the federal or state level may find a home at the
local level. For example, since 2013, twenty-eight cities have passed
40
ordinances ensuring that workers have access to paid sick days,
while a federal paid sick days bill has been reintroduced and ne41
glected in Congress seven times since 2004. Paid sick days ordinances are often proposed by the political left, and the success of
local-level legislation highlights the fact that city sovereignty has
42
inescapable political and ideological components. Cities or urban
areas are increasingly liberal, or at least more likely to vote for the
Democratic Party, while rural and non-urban areas are more likely
43
to vote for the Republican Party. In other words, intrastate
preemption laws are, in part, an outgrowth of differences in ideology and policy priorities between localities and states.

37. This Note does not focus on the difference between city or urban governance and
other forms of local government, such as in rural areas or suburbs. In the last two years,
there have been multiple articles discussing the “urban disadvantage” within state legislatures. Bringing together federalism and politics, these articles argue that more liberal constituents in cities can create large margins for candidates on the left. State legislatures with
many rural districts tend to elect more legislators on the right, however, and rural representatives can outnumber their counterparts from cities even though they represent fewer
people. In other words, rural areas often have an outsized sway in state legislatures. This is
true at the national level as well. This phenomenon is important context for explaining the
success of preemptive state-level moves, as well as the political and ideological differences
between state and local actors. See Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 1—The Urban
Disadvantage in National and State Lawmaking, 77 LA. L. REV. 287 (2016); Diller, supra note 17.
38. Parlow, supra note 4, at 375.
39. Id. at 374.
40. The National Partnership for Women and Families, CURRENT PAID SICK DAYS LAWS
(2017),
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/work-family/psd/currentpaid-sick-days-laws.pdf.
41. Healthy Families Act, H.R. 4575, 108th Cong. (2004), https://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/108/hr4575.
42. See supra discussion in notes 34 and 37.
43. See Stahl, supra note 29, at 136.
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On the other hand, there is concern that an influx of local regu44
lation will create an untenable patchwork of laws within states.
From this view, for example, different minimum-wage requirements in different cities might inhibit intrastate business investment because a business would be unable to keep track of what it
must pay its workers in each city or municipality. The argument
follows that there are certain issues that require uniformity across a
45
state.
Although an advocacy perspective as opposed to an academic
one, the American City Community Exchange (ACCE) takes the
stance that the Constitution’s vision of federalism purposefully includes only state and federal divisions. ACCE is an offshoot of the
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), which is devoted
to engaging “local elected officials and leaders from business and
industry for the advancement of limited government and free
46
market principles.” By this logic, local government is only meant
47
to be an administrative extension of the state. Further, one proponent of preemption argues that state-level opposition to local
ordinances is consistent with conservative ideology in that it is resistance to big government via “nanny-statist municipal bureau48
crats.”
Preemption is an integral piece of American governance, yet
Professor Briffault labels the current situation of explicit, state leg49
islative preemption as “new preemption.” “Old preemption” was
“a judicial determination” about whether local law contradicted
50
preexisting state law : “Classic preemption analysis harmonized
the efforts of different levels of government in areas in which both
enjoy regulatory authority and determined the degree to which
51
state policies might coexist with local additions or variations.” In
recent years, localities and cities have taken more direct policy ac44. Patrick Gleason, 2017 Looks to Be a Big Year for States Beating Back Local Tyranny,
FORBES.COM (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/patrickgleason/2016/12/06/
2017-looks-to-be-a-big-year-for-states-beating-back-local-tryanny/#20c505d13ee0 (“It makes it
more difficult and costly to do business and work in a state when there is a patchwork of local laws and regulations for companies and workers to navigate. This is why it is a good for
employers and employees alike for states to preempt things like local minimum wage hikes
and occupational licensing requirements.”).
45. See, e.g., Stahl, supra note 29, at 171; Gleason, supra note 44.
46. American City County Exchange (ACCE), “About ACCE,” http://www.acce.us/
about/.
47. Jon D. Russell & Aaron Bostrom, FEDERALISM, DILLON RULE AND HOME RULE,
AMERICAN CITY COUNTY EXCHANGE 3 (2016), https://www.alec.org/app/uploads/
2016/01/2016-ACCE-White-Paper-Dillon-House-Rule-Final.pdf.
48. Gleason, supra note 44.
49. Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995, 1997–98
(2018).
50. Id.
51. Id.
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tions, and these ordinances have increasingly been met with reactionary preemption laws at the state level. In other words, where
cities pass laws that do not expressly conflict with state or federal
law, states legislatures have passed laws targeted at specific cities,
52
where permitted, or specific policy issues that bar the local action.
53
Due to state supremacy, the state-level laws preempt the local laws.
Today, scholars are striving to articulate a new theory of local
control that addresses the political underpinnings of the wave of
state preemption legislation. If leveraging preemption as a political
tool is undesirable, understanding why doing so does not “seem
right” still requires a theory of local power. In early 2018, Professor
Richard Briffault expressed reticence about efforts to imbue theories of local control with “a political valence” where there should
54
not necessarily be one. This concern is essential: If efforts to disrupt the current pattern of intrastate preemption become—or at
least, are perceived as—left-leaning cities’ attempts to wrest more
power from conservative state legislatures and vice versa, a shift in
state-level or local-level partisan politics may disrupt the whole or55
der. In other words, a sound theory of local authority that protects local actors from state-level preemption should be just as applicable and appealing regardless of which political party or ideoideological group is in control.
Preemption is a part of our constitutional structure, and scholars
acknowledge that, on certain issues, equally persuasive arguments
56
can be made in favor of local control and state control. The critical question is, when do preemption laws go too far? This Note
posits that if intrastate preemption is a thinly-veiled tool to thwart
opposing political interests or appease political stakeholders, then
it is not serving its purpose as a systemic mechanism of governance.
The rest of this Note operates from the starting point that local
control is worth protecting regardless of political or ideological
motivation. The current wave of preemption laws may be politically
opportunistic and undertheorized, but preemption laws are not an
illegitimate use of a structural feature of our democratic system.
52. See Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response to Local Policy
Innovation, 47 J. FEDERALISM 403, 405–07 (2017).
53. Richard Briffault et al., supra note 16, at 9–10.
54. Briffault, supra note 49, at 2026. (“So are the concerns raised by the new preemption really about local autonomy, or is local autonomy only a means to the end of advancing
preempted policies? If, as Kenneth Stahl argues, ‘it is unlikely that voters and legislators will
see the question of local power as anything but a partisan issue,’ should these issues—of
firearms, workplace equity, discrimination, immigration law enforcement, or public
health—be argued solely on substantive policy lines rather than as also involving local autonomy? Certainly there is no necessary connection between local autonomy and progressive values.”).
55. Id. at 2027.
56. Stahl, supra note 29, at 171.
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This Note proposes solutions, through state constitutions and judicial interpretations, that may provide local government with more
opportunities to challenge and check preemptive action by state
57
legislatures.
II. THE STATUS OF PREEMPTION IN STATE AND LOCAL LAW
A. State-Level Preemption Laws Across the Country
Part I addressed the broad background of state-level preemption
of local ordinances. Part II investigates specific illustrative examples of preemption, as well as the recent increase in preemptive
legislation. Preemptive actions from state legislatures are not an
explicit political movement, but they are undergirded by the calcu58
lated actions of political strategists. In many cases, it is difficult to
see this increase in state preemption as anything other than a reaction to increased governing action at the local level, especially on
59
highly political, controversial issues.
57. See, e.g., id. at 174 (“When courts proceed on the assumption that Madisonian democracy is still operative, despite increasing evidence that society is composed of competing
groups, it leads precisely to the political crisis point we have now reached, in which a dominant group uses the structure of democratic institutions to preserve its dominance.”).
58. See discussion of ALEC and ACCE, infra Part II.B.
59. Sometimes, the reaction happens at both the state and local level: Following the
2016 presidential election and the introduction of the “Stop Dangerous Sanctuary Cities
Act” in Congress in 2017, for example, at least four cities declared themselves sanctuary cities and thirty-seven cities recommitted to their sanctuary city status, for a total of around 330
sanctuary cities. Riverstone-Newell, supra note 52, at 414. In turn, since 2015, the number of
state legislatures considering legislation to preempt local sanctuary city actions has increased
over time, with at least eight states considering bills in 2015, an additional eighteen states
considering bills in 2016, and 29 states considering bills in 2017. The state bills had mixed
success. Id. at 415.
Professors Briffault, Davidson, Diller, Johnson, and Schragger detail another highprofile example that shows the reactionary aspect of state preemption laws. Since 2015, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee have enacted preemptive legislation to prevent local
authorities from creating LGBTQIA antidiscrimination ordinances that were more protective than state laws. Briffault et al., supra note 16, at 6. These preemption laws followed efforts in cities to enact greater protections for LGBTQIA people. Id. North Carolina’s “bathroom bill” may be the most well-known of these preemption laws. In February 2016,
Charlotte, North Carolina, passed an ordinance prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations based on sexual orientation or gender identity. The ordinance also permitted transgender people to use the bathroom that aligned with their gender identity. Id. at 7;
DuPuis, supra note 9, at 11. In response, in March 2016, the North Carolina legislature
passed a law that prohibited local antidiscrimination ordinances related to public accommodations and employment. Further, the law provided that bathrooms must be designated
for use by people based on their biological sex, and the definition of “biological sex” included the gender assigned at birth. Briffault et al., supra note 16, at 7; Camila Domonoske and
James Doubek, North Carolina Repeals Portions Of Controversial ‘Bathroom Bill,’ NPR (Mar. 30,
2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/30/522009335/north-carolinalawmakers-governor-announce-compromise-to-repeal-bathroom-bill; Camila Domonoske, AP
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Preemptive action at the state level touches a vast array of substantive issues, including fracking, employment issues, antidiscrimination laws to protect LGBTQIA people, zoning, the use of pesticides, public and charter school policy, affordable housing rerequirements, plastic bag use, and the provision of public internet,
60
among others. The National League of Cities produced an extensive report documenting and quantifying state legislation, although
the report does not show when the preemption laws were actually
passed. However, the National League of Cities’ numbers still show
the extent of preemption legislation as of early 2018 on a wide variety of issues:
x
Twenty-eight states had laws that preempted local action relating to the minimum wage. In certain states,
such as Colorado and New Hampshire, these were
61
longstanding state regimes. However, North Carolina, Ohio, and Alabama implemented their laws in
62
2016.
x
Twenty-three had laws that preempted local action re63
garding paid family and medical leave.
x
Forty-one states preempted local action on “transpor64
tation network companies,” such as Uber and Lyft.
x
Twenty preempted local governments’ ability to estab65
lish municipal broadband.
x
Forty-two states placed some sort of limitation on local
66
government’s ability to regulate taxing and spending.
These limitations appear to be older and more estab67
lished, as many were first introduced in the 1970s.
x
Forty-three states prevented local governments from
passing firearm or ammunition safety ordinances that
68
are more stringent than state laws.
The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) has analyzed the timing of
some preemption laws, focusing on laws preempting wage and laCalculates North Carolina’s ‘Bathroom Bill’ Will Cost More Than $3.7 Billion, NPR (Mar. 27,
2017),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/27/521676772/ap-calculatesnorth-carolinas-bathroom-bill-will-cost-more-than-3-7-billion.
60. See generally Richard Schragger, LEGAL EFFORT TO ADDRESS PREEMPTION (LEAP)
PROJECT, STATE PREEMPTION OF LOCAL LAWS: PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF SUBSTANTIVE AREAS
(2017), https://www.abetterbalance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/State-Preemptionof-Local-Laws.pdf.
61. DuPuis, supra note 9, at 6.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 8.
64. Id. at 12.
65. Id. at 17.
66. Id. at 20.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 23 (citing the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence).
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bor ordinances at the local level. EPI found that of the twenty-five
states that have preempted local minimum wage ordinances, ap69
proximately half have done so since 2013. Of the twenty states
that preempt paid leave laws, only one preemption law was enacted
70
prior to 2011. Of the twelve states that have passed laws preempting local governments from passing prevailing wage laws, which
require contractors to pay workers the average wage in a locality
when working on public construction contracts, eleven have been
71
passed since 2013.
Perhaps most remarkable is that, since 2015, nine states have
passed laws that prevent local governments from passing ordinances to regulate the ways in which workers’ hours can be scheduled.
EPI did not find any similar laws prior to 2015, and most of these
72
laws were passed in 2016 and 2017. The only law recorded in 2015
was Michigan’s “Death Star Bill,” which prohibits a variety of local
regulation relating to labor and employment. It prohibits localities
from raising the minimum wage, regulating paid or unpaid leave,
73
and regulating employee scheduling, among other provisions.
The Michigan bill was singular because most preemptive legislation
is enacted piecemeal. By contrast, the Local Government Labor
Regulatory Limitation Act, the enacted version of the Death Star
Bill, was an effort to ensure that the state “occupied the field” or
74
totally regulated any action in that area.
These data provide an illustrative, if incomplete, picture of the
state of preemption laws throughout the country. Understanding
the uptick in state preemption laws is another matter, however. It is
not entirely clear why preemption laws are on the rise, but legal
and political theorists, as well as political advocacy organizations,
have some opinions.

69. See Marni Von Wilpert, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, CITY GOVERNMENTS ARE
RAISING STANDARDS FOR WORKING PEOPLE—AND STATE LEGISLATORS ARE LOWERING THEM
BACK DOWN fig. A (2017), https://www.epi.org/publication/city-governments-are-raisingstandards-for-working-people-and-state-legislators-are-lowering-them-back-down/.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. The law provides an example of “express preemption,” stating: “The legislature
finds and declares that regulation of the employment relationship between a nonpublic
employer and its employees is a matter of state concern and is outside the express or implied authority of local governmental bodies to regulate, absent express delegation of that
authority to the local governmental body.” Local Government Labor Regulatory Limitation
Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 123.1382 (LexisNexis 2017).
74. See Local Government Labor Regulatory Limitation Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §
123.1381 (LexisNexis 2017). The law’s broad-ranging and immediate effect inspired its
nickname. See Emily Lawler, ‘Death Star’ bill protesters interrupt House committee meeting, MLIVE
(May 19, 2015), https://www.mlive.com/lansing-news/index.ssf/2015/05/death_star_
bill_protesters_int.html (“If this bill passes the voices of millions of Michigan voters will be
silenced very suddenly. That’s why it’s a death star [referencing the Star Wars films]”).
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B. Explaining the Rise in Intrastate Preemption
Throughout the United States, state legislatures have become
more conservative, while cities have grown more liberal. 75 Professors Diller and Stahl emphasize preemption as a byproduct of
more liberal cities’ disadvantage within the state system. In other
words, as conservative legislators gained power in state capitals and
found themselves beholden to rural constituents, they passed more
76
preemption laws. At the same time, state legislators are less concerned with preemption laws causing economic harm to rural areas or a state overall because there are fewer economic links be77
tween cities and rural areas than there have been in the past. This
outlook suggests that deregulatory ideology must carry some
weight in state legislators’ decisions to take action in certain are78
as.
Professor Stahl goes so far as to say that cultural differences created by the rural/urban divide mean that the “traditional rivalry
between urban and rural areas in American politics is now expressed vertically in the relationship between the state and its cit79
ies.” It is difficult, otherwise, to understand why rural voters would
be concerned whether Detroit, for example, is able to raise its minimum wage or regulate how private businesses schedule their
workers’ hours. Why should “big government” action in a city matter to those who do not live there? Preemptive action allows state
legislatures to advance their own ideological goals and score a win
against their political opponents, as represented by localities and
local actions. In fact, EPI noted that while ALEC and ACCE have
argued against a “patchwork of laws” related to local minimum
wage increases or scheduling regulation, they have encouraged local governments to create a different patchwork of laws by adopting “right to work” ordinances, which are traditionally conserva80
tive, anti-labor measures.
Professor Schragger argues that efforts to preempt local regulation appear to be a reaction to a perceived threat from “wayward”
cities and an effort “driven by a combination of corporate deregulatory opportunism, culture-war hostility, and economic popu81
lism.” A concern is that state legislators may not always thoughtfully consider the potential future ramifications of their
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Stahl, supra note 29, at 136-37.
See id. at 154.
Id. at 146.
See, e.g., Schragger, supra note 10, at 1182.
Stahl, supra note 29, at 144.
Von Wilpert, supra note 69, at 15.
Schragger, supra note 10, at 1215–16.
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preemptive moves. State legislatures’ reactionary preemption laws
also lack a persuasive intellectual foundation. Protecting cities
82
from “nanny-statist municipal bureaucrats” may be well and good;
yet, by passing preemptive legislation, state legislators take on the
role of nanny-bureaucrat themselves. Why does “deregulation” at
the local level require regulation at the state level?
While political motivations may be a large part of the reason
preemption has become a more common practice for state legislatures, there is also evidence that conservative political organizations and lobbyists have contributed in a concerted effort to use
83
preemption to advance policy goals. Most scholars indicate the
84
importance of ALEC, in addition to industry groups. ALEC provides “assistance with strategic planning” and even offers free,
85
online model legislation for preemptive state-level laws. For example, preemption bills in both Alabama in 2016 and Arkansas in
2017 contained language that was strikingly similar to one of
86
ALEC’s model bills, “The Living Wage Mandate Preemption Act.”
The model bill contained the following language: “private enterprises in this state must be allowed to function in a uniform envi87
ronment with respect to mandated wage rates.” In turn, the Arkansas bill argued that “‘allowing localities to mandate employerprovided benefits would create a patchwork of local regulations’
88
that would burden businesses.”
It makes sense that industry and lobbying groups seek favorable
legislation at the state level: “The vertical fragmentation of authority in a three-tiered political system provides for multiple bites at
89
the legislative apple.” If the point is increased opportunity to
82. Gleason, supra note 44.
83. Professor Riverstone-Newell catalogues the ways in which industry and lobbying
groups have worked to influence state actors and, in some cases, “rein in” cities and “create
a friendlier business environment for themselves.” Riverstone-Newell, supra note 52, at 405.
She notes that at least one tobacco company urged states to pass preemption laws in the
1980s in order to avoid local smoking restrictions. Id. Likewise, in the 1990s, the National
Rifle Association successfully campaigned for laws that preempted local firearm regulation
and, as mentioned above, today forty-three states have some form of preemptive law relating
to firearms. Id.
84. Riverstone-Newell, supra note 52, at 405–06; Schragger, supra note 10, at 1170;
Stahl, supra note 29, at 137 n.9.
Notably, Professor Stahl dismisses the work of groups such as ALEC and its progressive
counterpart, the State Innovation Exchange, as “part of the same process of political and
geographic polarization that has caused city and state governments to assume such divergent political profiles.” Stahl, supra note 29, 137 n.9. I believe there is some room to question whether such coordinated advocacy campaigns are part of polarization and urban/rural
division or whether they are actually, in part, a driver of action-oriented polarization.
85. Riverstone-Newell, supra note 52, at 405.
86. Von Wilpert, supra note 69. See also DuPuis, supra note 8, at 6.
87. Von Wilpert, supra note 69.
88. Id.
89. Schragger, supra note 10, at 1184.
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achieve policy goals, then there is motivation to take advantage of
structural levers such as preemption. Other factors also matter,
however, and the current surge in preemption legislation at the
state level can be seen as a combination of increased political polarization, particularly between rural and non-rural constituencies,
90
and increased local government action on certain issues. Regardless of political beliefs—whether cities are acting beyond their purview or state legislators are taking advantage of the system to notch
a political win—preemptive state action raises deep questions
about the interplay of government at different levels. Preemption
laws present an issue in need of reform.
C. The Difficulty of Challenges to State-Level Preemption Laws
Localities hoping to challenge new or old state-level preemption
laws have an uphill battle. Part III focuses on reforms to state constitutions and judicial interpretation because of the issues with litigation challenges outlined in this sub-Part. The few exemplary federal cases often rely on equal-protection claims, which courts
91
typically reject. Lewis v. Bentley, for example, challenged an Alabama law that preempted local governments from raising the minimum wage. 92 Alabama’s legislature passed the law shortly after
93
Birmingham enacted an ordinance raising the minimum wage.
Litigants from Birmingham argued that “by shifting decisionmaking authority from a city with an African-American majority to
a white-dominated state legislature, preemption restructured deci94
sion-making in a manner that violated equal protection.” The dis95
trict court rejected this argument, and dismissed the case. The
court was not persuaded that preempting local action on the minimum wage was sufficiently related to racial discrimination, even if
96
most minimum-wage earners in Birmingham were Black. In July
2018, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
97
surprisingly reversed in part and remanded the case. The panel
addressed standing issues before holding that plaintiffs had stated
a valid equal protection claim under Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-

90. See, e.g., Riverstone-Newell, supra note 52; Schragger, supra note 10; Stahl, supra
note 29.
91. Briffault et al., supra note 16, at 13.
92. Lewis v. Bentley, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13565 *1 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 1, 2017).
93. Briffault et al., supra note 16, at 14–15.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 15.
96. Id. See also Lewis, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13565, at *1.
97. Lewis v. Governor of Alabama, 896 F.3d 1282, 1287, 1298 (11th Cir. 2018).
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tan Housing Development Corporation. 98 Of course, it remains to be
seen whether, on remand, Birmingham’s equal protection claim is
successful.
The success of state-law challenges relies on the nature of the
preemptive law, the sort of home rule protections enshrined in a
state constitution, and the type of challenge brought (procedural,
dealing with general laws, etc.). Two recent successes actually highlight the difficulty of winning preemption challenges absent engrained constitutional or judicial footholds. First, Coral Gables,
Florida, successfully defeated a state statute that prohibited local
99
regulation of the use of Styrofoam containers. This win was predicated upon the nature of Florida’s Constitution, however, which
prohibits the state legislature from passing any law targeted solely
100
at Miami-Dade County, of which Coral Gables is a part. Second,
in City of Cleveland v. State of Ohio, the court drew upon “longstanding Ohio precedent” to hold that a law targeting an employ98. Id. at 1294 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977)). For a discussion of the ways in which the Eleventh Circuit’s application of Arlington
Heights was surprising, see Recent Case: Equal Protection—Race Discrimination—Eleventh Circuit
Reverses Dismissal of Discrimination Claim Relying on Historical and Statistical Evidence—Lewis v.
Governor of Alabama, 896 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2018), 132 HARV. L. REV. 771, 775–78
(2018).
It is worth noting that, in Lewis v. Governor of Alabama, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a
political process argument. The viability of a political process argument elsewhere is unclear. Lewis v. Governor of Alabama, 896 F.3d at 1297–98. See, e.g., Briffault et al., supra note 16,
at 13–14 (discussing this process argument where there is a “bare desire” to harm a “protected group.”). Hunter v. Erickson and Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 created an
opportunity for “scrutin[y of] structural actions that place a ‘special burden’ on the ability
of minorities to achieve their policy goals in the political process.” Id. at 14 (citing Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467
(1982)). Briffault et al. argue that the Hunter and Seattle decisions might allow members of
protected groups to argue that the “reallocation of power from the local level to the state
level” creates a special burden. Id. In Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623,
1637–38 (2014), however, the Supreme Court rejected the application of Hunter and Seattle
to a Michigan ballot initiative that prohibited race-based preferences in public university
admissions. The Court held that Hunter and Seattle addressed actual injuries, or the serious
risk of injury, to a protected group, while Schuette was about whether Michigan voters could
decide if universities should continue to use a system of racial preferences. Schuette v. BAMN,
134 S. Ct. 1637–38 (“This case is not about how the debate about racial preferences should
be resolved. It is about who may resolve it.”). The Court was divided in Schuette. It is not clear
that a Hunter or Seattle-style argument could survive without showing that a policy was intentionally discriminatory, even though the holding in Schuette did not overturn Hunter or Seattle. Id. at 1637–38. The Eleventh Circuit was similarly reticent in their interpretation of
Schuette. Lewis v. Governor of Alabama, 896 F.3d at 1298. (“Thus, while we acknowledge the
social and economic history behind the plaintiffs’ assertion that the minimum wage is a racial issue, their claim still falls outside the Supreme Court’s limited application of the political-process doctrine to laws explicitly addressing racial harms such as segregation and discrimination in the housing market.” (citations removed)).
99. Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. The City of Coral Gables, No. 2016-018370-CA-01, 6–7 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.politico.com/states/f/?id=0000015b-f3b6-d5fd-a55bfffe81150001; Briffault et al., supra note 16, at 12.
100. Briffault et al., supra note 16, at 12.
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ment-related Cleveland ordinance did not meet the Ohio Constitu101
tion’s generality requirement. In other words, the state legislature’s law was so clearly an effort to limit or target the Cleveland
ordinance that it could not be deemed permissibly general and
102
applicable to the whole state as required by the Constitution.
These two successes owe much to the specific quirks of the respective state constitutions and case law out of which they come.
For Coral Gables, while some states require state legislatures to pass
laws that are “general” and affect all localities, there are fewer instances of states that prohibit laws targeted at specific cities or local
103
governments. Courts tend to find laws to be general if they can
104
affect all localities in a state, even if they particularly affect one.
For City of Cleveland, Ohio’s case law is unusual in its suspicion of
nominally general laws. A litigation challenge to a law that specifically preempts or explicitly occupies a field, such as Michigan’s
“Death Star” bill, would be much more difficult because Michigan
does not have the judicial or statutory safety valves to check
105
preemptive action by the state legislature.
As such, Pennsylvania Restaurant and Lodging Association v. City of
Pittsburgh might be a more typical example of an attempt to chal106
lenge a preemptive state law. In that case, the court rejected
Pittsburgh’s argument that it was permitted to enact a paid sick
days ordinance under its home rule charter. The court held that
this was not the type of public health law considered by the charter
and that the charter also prohibited Pittsburgh from placing “af107
firmative duties” upon employers. The dissent urged that this decision read limitations into Pittsburgh’s home rule charter that did
108
not exist. It highlighted precedent that recognized the difference
between health and safety ordinances that affect businesses and or109
dinances that are intended to regulate businesses.
In conclusion, preemption as a political and ideological tool
touches many substantive issue areas and there has been an uptick
of state legislation within the last five years that has responded di101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See infra Appendix.
104. Davidson, supra note 20.
105. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
106. Pa. Rest. & Lodging Ass’n v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 79 C.D. 2016, 2017 Pa. Commw.
Unpub. LEXIS 356, at *1 (2017).
107. Id. at *5.
108. Id. at *10–12.
109. Id. It must be noted, however, that shortly before this Note’s publication, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the paid sick leave law was within Pittsburgh’s home rule
authority. Matt Miller, City can force private employers to provide paid sick leave, Pa. Supreme Court
rules, PENNLIVE (Jul. 17, 2019), https://www.pennlive.com/news/2019/07/city-can-forceprivate-employers-to-provide-paid-sick-leave-pa-supreme-court-rules.html.
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rectly to or anticipated local action. While preemption and “intrastate federalism” are important functions of our governing system,
local governments should have the ability to rebut state legislatures’ preemptive actions. The next Part discusses the theory behind trying to find a middle ground and stakes a claim for greater
local power, while retaining preemptive ability.
III. RE-IMAGINING LOCAL POWER WITHIN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
The issue-specific nature of recent state-level preemption laws
and the downloadable, boiler-plate bills for state legislators
demonstrate that there is an effort to use preemption as a tool to
arrest local action driven by partisan and demographic divides.
There is an evolving debate among scholars of local power about
the best way to “reboot” home rule laws and principles to provide
local governments with greater protection from preemption and
more opportunity to challenge preemptive actions by state legisla110
tures. Part III examines and critiques proposals that have already
been made and offers further solutions.
There is longstanding writing on the role judicial interpretation
can play in reorienting home rule. Often, preemption-focused legal challenges turn on whether state law explicitly or implicitly
preempts a field of regulation such that it prohibits local action in
111
that field or issue area. In some instances, judicial analysis also
112
requires an assessment of the state legislature’s intent. This can
be an opaque inquiry, and at least one scholar posits that there
should be an “express-only” default rule in judicial determinations
113
of preemption. In other words, local ordinances should only be
114
preempted when state law expressly says they are. Professor Diller
notes that this stance deprives judges of discretion and flexibility to
115
handle “unforeseen circumstances.”
110. See,
e.g.,
Defending
Local
Democracy,
A
BETTER
BALANCE,
https://www.abetterbalance.org/resources/defending-local-democracy/ (last visited Apr.
14, 2018); The Local Solutions Support Center (LSSC), LEAP, http://leappreemption.org/index.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2018). These projects appear to be connected.
111. See generally Diller, supra note 16.
112. See infra note 184 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Paul Diller, Massachusetts,
URB. L. CTR., at 3–4 (May 2017), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1;
Paul Diller, Texas, URB. L. CTR., at 2–3 (May 2017), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copyof-leap-materials-1; Paul Diller, Washington, URB. L. CTR., at 4 (May 2017),
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
113. Diller, supra note 16, at 1159.
114. Id.
115. Id. Instead, he favors a “substantial interference test” that asks courts to weigh
whether a local ordinance “contravenes the broad purposes of state law.” Id. at 1168–70.
Professor Diller sees this avenue of judicial interpretation as a flexible method for ensuring
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In light of the fact that judicial challenges to intrastate preemption have been limited by restrictive interpretations of state constitutions and ironclad state laws, Part III extends previous research
and proposes state constitutional changes to better address the
problem of intrastate preemption, in addition to recommendations for judicial interpretation. Passing constitutional amendments may be a tall order for states that have passed local preemption laws; yet, it is also important to consider all possible reforms as
local actors and state legislators look to redefine the home rule
framework in a way that presents a coherent theory of local control
and is less vulnerable to the political motivations of state legislators
who disagree with local actors.
A. State Constitutional Home Rule and Arguments for
Local Immunization
Although most states provide for some sort of home rule for localities, there is considerable variety among states. Some states,
such as Alabama and Delaware, do not have constitutional home
116
rule of any kind. Instead, state statutes provide for local grants of
power or limited home rule, but these laws do not have the procedural protections that constitutional home rule provides—that is, it
is more difficult to change constitutions. In Alabama, for example,
117
a 1975 state law grants some authority to municipal corporations.
While the state permits local action, it also leaves the door wide
118
open for state-level preemption.
Even in states that do provide for constitutional home rule, the
extent and expression of home rule can be constrained in certain
ways. For example, some states limit home rule by the size of the
city, municipality, or county. In Illinois, counties and municipalities with over 25,000 people are automatically considered home
rule units, while all other municipalities may elect to become

protection for local policy innovation and protection from local “expropriative” or exclusionary action. Id. at 1170.
116. Paul
Diller,
Alabama,
URB.
L.
CTR.,
at
1
(May
2017),
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/Table of Contentscopy-of-leap-materials-1; Paul Diller,
Delaware, URB. L. CTR., at 1 (May 2017), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leapmaterials-1.
117. See Diller, Alabama, supra note 116, at 1 (providing that local corporations can
adopt ordinances to “provide for the safety, preserve the health, promote the prosperity and
improve the morals, order, comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of the municipality,
and may enforce obedience to such ordinances”).
118. See id. (“The legislature shall not have the power to authorize any municipal corporation to pass any laws inconsistent with the general laws of this state.”).
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home rule via referendum. 119 Moreover, the grant of home rule
powers can be limited to specific issue areas or expressly subject to
the state legislature’s decision to preempt. Again, Illinois’s Constitution serves as a useful demonstration: “[A] home rule unit may
exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to
regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and
welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.” At the same time, the
state legislature has the option to “deny or limit” any home rule
120
authority with a three-fifths vote. In other words, large cities and
municipalities can do as they please, unless the state legislature says
otherwise. Home rule that grants broad authority to local governments but also retains state preemption power is a common ap121
proach to constitutional home rule.
There are two other approaches to constitutional home rule:
enumerated powers and immune powers. Alaska’s constitutional
home rule provision, for example, is cabined by a state statute that
lists sixty-seven state laws representing areas where the state has
denied home rule units’ authority. The listed areas focus on regulatory concerns (such as licensing and waste disposal), taxation,
122
and election structure. Yet the list also includes quirkier areas of
state-only regulation, such as public breastfeeding and unmanned
123
aircraft (presumably drone) photography. While clear and precise, this reliance on enumerated grants and denials of power is
cumbersome. It also relies on express preemption, which can cre124
ate other problems. It stands to reason that the rigidity of such
constitutional provisions or state statutes is inelegant and difficult
to overcome through judicial testing. Enumerating provisions
place control in the state legislature and leave localities with little
125
recourse.
Although many states have a form of constitutional home rule,
fifteen states provide localities with some constitutional or statutory
119. Paul Diller, Illinois, URB. L. CTR. 1 (May 2017), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/
copy-of-leap-materials-1.
120. Id. (citing ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(g)) (“The General Assembly by a law approved
by the vote of three-fifths of the members elected to each house may deny or limit the power
to tax and any other power or function of a home rule unit not exercised or performed by
the State . . . .”).
121. See infra Appendix.
122. ALASKA STAT. § 29.10.200. See also Paul Diller, Alaska, URB. L. CTR. 2 (May 2017),
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
123. ALASKA STAT. § 29.10.200. See also Diller, Alaska, supra note 122.
124. See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text.
125. By contrast, Illinois might provide a more functional comparison. Illinois’ Constitution enumerates more grants and prohibitions for home rule units than other states’ constitutions, but it also includes broad grants of power and instructs a liberal reading of the
grants. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6.
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protection from preemption. 126 This number is debatable depending on how protection or immunity is defined. Functional immunity from state interference—areas in which the state cannot act
short of constitutional amendment—is typically limited to purely
structural and local issues, such as compensation for local offic127
ers. But there are other forms of protection, as well: For example, Colorado’s Constitution provides that the state cannot over128
ride local action on “purely local and municipal matters.” The
constitution enumerates some areas that are local and municipal
concerns, including the structure of local elections and mechanisms for collecting local taxes, but does not limit home rule to
129
these issue areas. Even with protections as robust as these, home
rule in Colorado only applies to localities with more than 2,000
people. Further, the judiciary has a significant role in determining
whether an issue is of local concern, opening the door to more
130
limited interpretations of “purely local and municipal matters.”
Professor Diller sees exceptions to home rule provisions that
permit only “general” state laws to preempt local authority as a
131
form of “soft immunity.” Whether these requirements serve as
real protection from preemption is debatable, as courts are often
132
more inclined to find laws to be general rather than targeted.
Moreover, constitutional requirements that a state’s legislature can
only pass laws of “general concern” also serve as “soft immunity”
for local government actions and provide opportunity to challenge
133
laws that target specific localities or local actions. There is a
counterpoint to that assessment of general laws, however. Most
states already prohibit their legislatures from passing “special or
134
local” laws. The problem lies in the fact that state constitutions
do not always define “special,” and these provisions have often
been interpreted as prohibitions against “private laws”—that is,
laws affecting a specific corporation or person, rather than specific
135
localities.
Other states protect home rule via judicial interpretation: In
Connecticut, the Constitution does not explicitly provide protec126. Diller, supra note 17, at 1067.
127. Id.
128. Paul Diller, Colorado, URB. L. CTR. 1 (May 2017), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/
copy-of-leap-materials-1.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2.
131. See discussion infra at pp. 971–72, as well as Appendix for examples of local protections from state preemption.
132. Id.
133. See Diller, supra note 17, at 1050–51.
134. Justin R. Long, State Constitutional Prohibitions on Special Laws, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
719, 720 (2012).
135. Id. at 724.
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tion for home rule, but judicial interpretation has created immunity in “the organization of local government (structural) and pro136
cedures for local budgeting.” In California, local home rule governments are protected from state interference as long as the issue
addresses local concern. In 1992, the California Supreme Court
held that Los Angeles could amend its charter to allow for public
financing for city elections, despite the fact that a statewide propo137
sition had banned such funding.
Professor Diller advocates for strengthening constitutional home
rule protection as a means of arresting the current wave of
preemption efforts and taking a step toward rebalancing urban
138
disadvantage. In his view, broader protections might serve the
function of halting intrastate preemption by protecting the local
139
minority from the state legislative minority. If—as this Note argues—preemption is a function of the weakness of “intrastate federalism” or state governing structures that mirror federal-state federalism but lack formalization, explicit constitutional protections
140
can embed de facto assumptions about local power. These reform ideas are presented in Part III.C.
136. Paul
Diller,
Connecticut,
URB.
L.
CTR.
3
(May
2017),
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
137. Paul
Diller,
California,
L.
CTR.
3
(May
2017),
URB.
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
138. Diller, supra note 17, at 1066–67.
139. Id. at 1050–51.
140. Stahl, supra note 29, at 164. Stahl goes even further and argues that the current rise
in preemption is exactly because “intrastate federalism” is not true federalism: “The root of
the problem is that intrastate federalism is not a true federal system, in which subgroups
have constitutionally committed power, but a unitary system in which state legislatures have
ample room to decide how much authority to confer upon substate groups.” Id. at 171.
Moreover, courts are reluctant to interpret greater authority for local governments because
of a “suspicion” of “group rights” “rooted in the tradition of Madisonian liberalism that fears
‘factions’ . . . .” Id. Professor Stahl differs from Professor Diller on an important point, however. He does not believe that more solid grants of power to local governments will solve the
problem of preemption because they will inevitably rely on courts’ interpretation of local
and statewide concerns. Id. at 174–175 n. 206. Instead, he argues that home rule is weakened by the process failure of partisan gerrymandering and advocates for the Supreme
Court to rule that partisan gerrymandering is judiciable in an effort to disrupt the urban/rural divide and strengthen the opportunity for local governments to act free from fear
of a state legislature’s politically-motivated retaliation. Id. at 175–177. (His ideas come from
an article published before the Court’s recent decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct.
2484 (2019), of course.)
His argument seeks to bypass the political implications of the current preemption debate:
Because partisan gerrymandering assures rural Republican control of the
statehouse in many places, urban Democrats can only wrest such control by relocating power elsewhere, and so home rule becomes a kind of code word for partisan politics. To strengthen home rule, in other words, would be to empower
Democratic cities vis-à-vis Republican legislatures; to weaken it would be to do the
opposite. In light of the obvious political implications of home rule, it is unlikely
that voters and legislators will see the question of local power as anything but a
partisan issue.
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Protecting local authority through immunizing home rule from
state interference is an efficient, yet deliberate, solution because it
141
reinforces the system of norms as it functions. Even if local governments are “creatures of the state,” it does not necessarily follow
that the state would or should want to centralize all local deci142
sions. While it is true that the state-local relationship does not entirely correlate to federal-state federalism, there is still value in the
model of cooperative federalism. Professor Davidson makes this
143
argument in terms of federal-local relationships. As he sees it,
“cooperative localism” provides for local experimentation and au144
thority while balancing the power of the federal sovereign. The
analogy is not a perfect fit, but the cooperation comparison is apt.
There is value in local control either by necessity or function of the
system. Intrastate preemption that negates the will of local government, then, serves as a warning that the cooperative norms are
not enough. Constitutional home rule protections are an opportunity to codify or solidify an important set of norms without requiring a total denial of the federalism-esque give-and-take between state and local power.
There is one final factor in debates of constitutional home rule
and local protection: if local control is inherent in our system of
governance, then protections from state preemption of local action should not be limited by the size of the locality, city, or municipality in question. Professor Diller points out that such an interpretation of local power has “always been a minority position in
145
American jurisprudence.” He argues that local immunization
without regard to the size of a locality would underscore rural and
146
suburban communities’ advantage. Professor Diller’s goal is to
remedy the urban/rural divide in state politics, with the rise in
state preemption demonstrating an undesirable outcome of that
divide. He is concerned about the potential externality effects of
small local government action, but it is not entirely clear how size-

Id. at 176. This is a very compelling argument. At the same time, and at the risk of not giving
the concerns at the heart of Federalist 10 their due, the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering speaks to negotiating the factions that already exist. Strengthened and protected
home rule could correct course for the future. Protecting local power from state or local
factions with greater grants of home rule power is not necessarily partisan or extreme. Instead, a more balanced and formalized structure would reorient the rules of the road.
141. See Briffault, supra note 49, at 2021–22.
142. See discussion infra note 147 and accompanying text.
143. Nestor Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 975–76 (2007).
144. Id. at 976.
145. Diller, supra note 17, at 1090–93.
146. Id.
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specific home rule provisions affect the political balance of state
147
legislatures or the distribution of seats in Congress.
B. Addressing the Divide Between State and Local Concerns
The problem of state and local concerns is critical in contemplating the form and function of a stronger constitutional home
rule framework to combat the misuse of intrastate preemption. In
states where there is home rule of any kind, the dividing line between that which can and cannot be preempted by the state legislature often turns on whether an issue is purely local or one that requires state uniformity and control. 148 The state and local concern
question is typically a judicial one, and states vary considerably in
149
tests and interpretations. For example, in Oklahoma, courts have
not outlined a clear test, but have determined that certain areas
are purely local concerns, such as the procedure for local elec150
tions. Oregon eschews the traditional state/local divide and allows state preemption of any “substantive social, economic or regulatory objective, unless the law is shown to be irreconcilable with
151
the local community’s freedom to choose its own political form.”
Still, this has been used to preempt considerable areas of regula152
tion.
There is debate about how courts should interpret statewide versus local concerns. To Professor Diller, everything comes down to
the state/local concern question because only local concerns are
protected under a strengthened constitutional home rule frame153
work. In fact, he argues that requiring states to only enact gen147. Id. at 1089–91. Professor Diller’s primary contention about the danger of home rule
protections unlinked to locality size is the fact that small communities may take actions that
would have effects on other communities: “Similarly, when a rural county seeks to exempt
itself from state gun control requirements, it allows firearms to be purchased there that can
then be used to commit violence in other parts of the state and nation.” Id. at 1091–92. He
also notes that these externality concerns apply to larger cities or even counties, as well. Given this, the link between size-limited local immunity and remedying the urban disadvantage
in state politics is unclear.
148. See generally Diller, supra note 16; Briffault, supra note 49.
149. See, e.g., People v. Llewellyn, 257 N.W.2d 902 (Mich. 1977) (outlining Michigan’s
preemption test); Johnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d 990 (Cal. 1992) (outlining California’s
preemption test).
150. Paul
Diller,
Oklahoma,
L.
CTR.,
at
2
(May
2017),
URB.
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
151. Paul Diller, Oregon, URB. L. CTR., at 2 (May 2017) (citing City of La Grande v. Public
Employees Retirement Board, 576 P.2d 1204, 1211 (Or. 1978), aff’d on reh’g, 586 P.2d 765
(Or. 1978)), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
152. Id. at 3.
153. Diller, supra note 17, at 1049–50 (“At its core, constitutional home rule rests on a
judicial defined distinction between ‘statewide’ and ‘local’ matters, with only the latter being
immune to preemption.”).
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eral laws in areas that need state uniformity creates a backdoor to
local immunity from preemption because a law targeted at a par154
ticular locality might be challenged as “not general.” The uniformity and generality requirements “call for a heightened level of
judicial inquiry into whether the state’s interest in preempting the
155
local government is legitimate.”
That said, there is a small but notable distinction among states
with “general law” requirements. Many states, such as Georgia, New
Mexico, and Arkansas, prohibit local action from conflicting or be156
ing inconsistent with state “general law.” A smaller number of
states, including Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Tennessee, require
state laws to be “general” or “uniform,” rather than special, local,
157
or targeted at one or more particular localities. The latter provisions often have some exceptions that permit special or local laws,
158
such as when voters approve of or request them. This may be a
distinction without a difference, but provisions of the latter sort
(limiting states’ ability to pass targeted or special laws) may provide
more protection than requirements in the first category (requiring
local governments to conform to general laws). Requiring state legislatures to pass laws that affect all local governments—and possibly
preventing them from passing targeted laws—might be interpreted
as a more explicit signal of a state legislature’s desire to protect local autonomy. These requirements limit the state legislature’s, rather than local governments’, ability to act and may provide local
governments with an opportunity to challenge targeted laws. At the
same time, in many instances, it may make sense that home rule
provisions and statutes prohibit local governments from creating
ordinances that conflict with existing state law. Home rule is about
providing opportunity and protection for local action, but it includes a necessary tension of line drawing between local and state
159
power.
154. Id. at 1077 (citing City of Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963, 967–68 (Oh. 2002)).
155. Id.
156. Paul Diller, Georgia, URB. L. CTR., (May 2017), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/
copy-of-leap-materials-1; Paul Diller, New Mexico, URB. L. CTR., (May 2017),
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1; Paul Diller, Arkansas, URB. L.
CTR., (May 2017), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1. Wisconsin
prohibits local action that conflicts with laws that are general and uniform, that is, apply to
all cities and relate to an issue of statewide concern. This inclines courts to find conflict, as
facial uniformity satisfies the requirement. Paul Diller, Wisconsin, URB. L. CTR. 2 (May 2017),
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
157. Diller, Massachusetts, supra note 112; Paul Diller, Minnesota, URB. L. CTR., (May
2017), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1; Paul Diller, Tennessee, URB.
L. CTR., (May 2017), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
158. See, e.g., Diller, Minnesota, supra note 157, at 3. See also Appendix infra.
159. Briffault, supra note 22, at 89–90 (“[In Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968),
the Supreme Court recognized] the ‘universal’ existence of local governments possessing
considerable autonomy and providing an important representational function. . . . [T]he
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While Diller leans into the state/local divide, Professor Briffault
takes another tack. He argues that the judicial question should
turn on whether the state is unduly impinging on the “local capaci160
By his estimation, this question elimity for self-governance.”
161
nates the need for a state/local consideration. This interpretation grounds the question in a locality’s ability to act, rather than a
judicial suspicion that local action may have crossed a line: “[A]
preemption measure should be held invalid if it interferes with the
power to act in the first place, which is the undisputed purpose of
home rule and which is essential to local government’s place in
162
our system.” This analysis means that localities can bring court
challenges against state preemption efforts to occupy an entire
field of regulation where both local governments and the state
have acted or where there is not defined grant of authority, such as
163
Michigan’s Local Government Labor Regulatory Limitation Act.
Moreover, he argues that this framework might also be used to
challenge state actions that create a “regulatory vacuum” by denying local authority to act without creating any substantive state laws
164
on the matter.
Professor Briffault’s rework of the judicial test to determine state
and local power is very persuasive. It provides an opportunity to
move away from a state/local analysis that, as he points out, “long
resisted, and is likely to long continue to resist, consistent, princi165
pled, neutral decision-making.” The fact that the test creates a
“home rule presumption” could go far in making it easier to challenge preemptive state legislation. At the same time, this new test is
not without limits. First, it still relies on judicial interpretation of
vague constitutional or statutory terms. As this Note argues below,
home rule may be a situation in which more constitutional specificity is warranted. Second, the test turns entirely on “unduly impinging.” Rather than relying on a single question of a state and local
divide, Professor Briffault’s test asks another singular question that
at its base is no different: Is this the type of issue or policy that local
normative implications are unmistakable. Avery treats counties and municipalities as political
institutions that initiate their own actions on behalf of local citizens rather than just implement state actions locally. . . . By raising localities to the status of governments, Avery also
raises the standing of the principle of local self-government. . . . Avery in a sense complements
Hunter [v. City of Pittsburgh], providing doctrinal recognition of the fact that, in practice, local
governments are agents of both the state and of local constituents, carrying out state functions locally
and acting on behalf of local residents and local interests. These two ways of conceiving of local legal
status are not entirely inconsistent but there is a tension between them.”) (emphasis added).
160. Briffault, supra note 49, at 2022.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 2023.
164. Id. at 2024.
165. Id. at 33.
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governments should be allowed to enact without interference from
the state?
C. Changing Both State Constitutions and Judicial Interpretation
Professor Briffault and Professor Diller both offer intriguing
proposals to remedy the issue of state preemption of local action.
Still, neither solution is entirely satisfying, perhaps due to the fact
that both of their recommendations are aimed at remedying the
democratic dysfunction exemplified by the rural/urban divide.
This Note offers reforms that build upon both Diller and
Briffault’s proposals but have a different focus. The goal of the reforms proposed below is to strengthen the role of local governments and create opportunities for localities to challenge state legislatures’ preemption laws. These reforms should be both
substantive and institutional. In other words, the substance of state
constitutions should include greater protections for local authority
and more clear paths to challenge state-level preemption. At the
same time, a substantive move also requires institutional actors to
consider who should decide if preemption is appropriate and how
these decisions should be made. These reforms do not seek to
eliminate the ability of states to preempt local authority or to cordon localities into their own untouchable spheres of sovereignty.
The current wave of preemption legislation skews to one side of
the political spectrum (the right preempting local action on the
left), but it also uncovers an opportunity to make the state-local relationship function better. The goal is to make sure that our governing structure represents underlying intuitions and norms about
self-representation, power balancing, and policy innovation, and
does not only present an opportunity to take advantage of the
structure for political gain.
This Part proposes three ways to achieve this goal by: 1) codifying a presumption of inherent local authority in state constitutions;
2) providing strong and explicit state constitutional protections for
local actions in the face of preemption; and 3) creating more
checks, both in state constitutions and judicial interpretation, to
enable local governments to challenge state preemption.
First, an institutional recommendation: It is worthwhile to
ground the idea that local governments have inherent authority in
both judicial interpretation and state constitutions. Courts should
implement Briffault’s presumption of home rule in their interpre166
167
tations. If the goal is fighting “new preemption,” as opposed to
166.

See supra notes 159–64 and accompanying text.
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remapping the rural/urban divide, a thumb on the scale for local
decisionmakers simply iterates a presumption (local governments
have inherent powers) that already exists.
One way to achieve this goal would be to give interpretative
weight to statements of legislative intent in constitutional home
rule provisions and to create new provisions where they do not exist. Some states have these provisions, and a few even speak to underlying assumptions about local authority. For example, Massachusetts’s Constitution provides that the purpose of its home rule
provisions is to “reaffirm the customary and traditional liberties of
the people with respect to the conduct of their local govern168
ment.” A Kentucky statute is more focused: “The powers herein
granted are based upon a legislative finding that the urban crisis
cannot be solved by actions of the General Assembly alone, and
that the most effective agency for the solution of these problems is
169
the government of a city of the first class.” New York’s Constitution states, “Effective local self-government and intergovernmental
170
cooperation are purposes of the people of the state.” In addition
to these legislative statements, at least nineteen states provide in
their home rule laws that powers granted to localities should be
liberally construed in localities’ favor, and at least six states provide
that enumeration or description of local powers should not be in171
terpreted as limiting local powers. In some cases, these state provisions were meant to make it clear that the state was abrogating
172
Dillon’s Rule in favor of home rule. These provisions might not
be enough to sway a judicial interpreter on their own, but they may
serve as an indication and codification of a state government’s be173
lief in local authority and intention to protect it.

167. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
168. MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXXIX, § 1.
169. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 83.410 (4).
170. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
171. See Appendix. For example, New York’s Constitution has both a liberal construction
provision and a statement of intent:
It is not the intention of the legislature hereby to abolish or curtail any rights,
privileges, powers or jurisdiction heretofore conferred upon or delegated to any
local government or to any board, body or officer thereof, unless a contrary intention is clearly manifest from the express provisions of this chapter or by necessary
intendment therefrom, or to restrict the powers of the legislature to pass laws
regulating matters other than the property, affairs or government of local governments as distinguished from matters relating to their property, affairs or government. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE § 50-51.
172. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. IV, §7, ¶ 11. See also Paul Diller, New Jersey, URB. L. CTR., at
2 (May 2017), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
173. In a singular example, West Virginia’s state court’s refusal to recognize home rule
and use of Dillon’s Rule principles triggered the creation of a Home Rule Pilot Project,
which permits certain cities to pass ordinances that conflict with state law, with oversight
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Finally, a presumption of local authority also means that home
rule should not or need not be limited by the size of a city, municipality, or locality. If local authority is good for local governments,
it should be available to them all. This does not negate the fact that
increased local authority might not make sense or be desirable for
every town or village in the United States. The current home rule
systems in states show that many eligible localities choose to not
174
become formal home rule entities. Rather, a home rule presumption adjusts the starting point for determinations of local
power.
Second, a substantive recommendation: State constitutions
should provide some grant of explicit protections to local home
rule entities. While express immunity limited to certain issue areas
might be too formally rigid, there is value in explicitly protecting
areas of local action, particularly if that protection is undergirded
by a Briffault-esque recognition that state legislatures should not
175
interfere in areas where local governments have previously acted.
Currently, states vary considerably in the extent to which local
authority is immune from state preemption or intervention, from
explicit spheres of total local control to easily circumvented prohi176
bitions of targeted laws. Areas of total local control are often limited to hyper-local issues, such as the compensation of local officers
or the structure of the local government. For example, in Ohio,
the “power of self-government,” or the power to address issues related “solely to the government and administration of the internal
affairs of the municipality,” appears to be immune from state
177
preemption. Oklahoma’s statute also firmly prevents preemption
by providing that local ordinance “prevails over state law on mat178
ters relating to purely municipal concerns.” There are two caveats to Oklahoma’s clear and explicit protection, however: First, because the provision is statutory, it is more easily changed than a
state constitution. Second, “purely municipal concerns” is vague

from a state “Home Rule Board.” Paul Diller, West Virginia, URB. L. CTR., at 3 (May 2017),
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
174. For example, in Tennessee, only 2 of 95 counties and 14 of 348 cities have adopted
home rule charters. For cities, this may be because of strong limitations to home rule powers. For counties, state statute provides non-home rule counties with some of the powers of a
home rule charter. Paul Diller, Tennessee, supra note 157, at 2–3 (May 2017),
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
175. See supra notes 159–64 and accompanying text.
176. See Appendix.
177. Paul Diller, Ohio, URB. L. CTR. 3 (May 2017) (citing Marich v. Bob Bennett Constr.
Co., 880 N.E.2d 906, 914 (Ohio 2008)), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leapmaterials-1.
178. OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 1-102.
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and has given Oklahoma courts the opportunity to limit an already
179
limited grant.
To address intrastate preemption and provide protections with
some teeth, it might be necessary for states to give courts clearer
instructions. For example, Maine has an unusual statutory provision that provides the focus for determining if a local law can be
preempted: “Standard of preemption. The Legislature shall not be
held to have implicitly denied any power granted to municipalities
under this section unless the municipal ordinance in question
180
would frustrate the purpose of any state law.”
Finally, constitutional protections for local action may not need
to be ironclad to be effective against preemption. Instead, it might
be better to ensure that there are safety-valve exceptions to local
protections. For example, some states have exemptions to their
general law requirements that often require the request or approv181
al of the localities affected by a special law. These laws permit local involvement or require local approval in a way that would be
useful in the preemption context, where the issue is centered on
the conflicting wills of local governments/residents and state legislators.
More importantly, state constitutions should provide protections
for local action that do not live or die by judicial line-drawing between state and local concerns. Current state constitutions tend to
rely on enumeration, whether intricately specific or broad catego182
ries of “local issues.” Instead, state constitutions’ home rule provisions could also ensure protections for local action through
preemption prohibitions on state legislatures. For example, a state
constitution could provide that the legislature shall not preempt or
prohibit local authority without a legitimate state interest. A legitimate state interest would then be defined as local government action that contradicts existing state law, local action that threatens
an aspect of state functioning, local action where the state was preparing to pass laws in a particular field, or some other constitutional or practical concern. This sort of protection departs from
Briffault’s proposal by placing the onus on the state, rather than
the locality, to defend its actions. Requiring an explanation of state
interest also addresses the concern that states create a policy vacuum where they preempt a field of regulation from local action but
183
decline to take state action.

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See Diller, Oklahoma, supra note 150, at 2–3.
ME. STAT. tit. 30-A, § 3001(3).
See Appendix.
Compare ALASKA STAT. § 29.10.200 with ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6.
See supra notes 159–64 and accompanying text.
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Requiring the state to give a firm and specific reason for
preempting local action either in statute or in response to a legal
challenge places less emphasis on the vague line between state
concerns and local concerns. The question would become: Is the
state’s interest important enough or legitimate enough? This
might trade one set of judicial considerations for another, but examining the state’s interest gets closer to the heart of current
preemption issues. It addresses the legislature’s intent by asking
whether it sought to prevent consequences that matter to the state
as a whole or whether the state only intended to prevent certain
local actions for political reasons. New York courts make a similar
inquiry when the state enacts a special or targeted law that is purportedly based on a statewide concern. Such laws must “bear a reasonable relationship to the legitimate, accompanying substantial
184
State concern.”
Third, a recommendation that is both substantive and institutional: There should, simply, be more built-in checks to state
preemption. State constitutions should have explicit general law
requirements. These requirements, or additional statutory provisions, might grant local governments standing to challenge nominally general laws. While there is room to debate how specific a
state constitution should be in defining a cause of action for localities, local governments should have an enshrined opportunity to
challenge preemption laws. These challenges could follow two different paths, depending on the issue: First, a locality might challenge the generality of a law as pretext. In other words, a law’s
nominal application to an entire state could in actuality have been
intended to undercut a particular city’s ordinance. Ohio courts
consider similar issues in determining whether a preemptive state
law is general. One part of Ohio’s test includes: “A statute must . . .
set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corpora185
tion to set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations . . . .”
In addition, localities should be able to challenge preemptive
state legislative action that creates a policy vacuum. If a law that affects an entire state creates an unknown frontier where local governments cannot act, and state governments choose not to, then it
should be possible to question why the issue requires generality
and uniformity across the state. While Briffault’s interference anal-

184. City of New York v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n, 676 N.E.2d 847, 851 (N.Y.
1996)). See also Paul Diller, New York, URB. L. CTR. 4 (May 2017),
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
185. Diller, Ohio, supra note 177, at 3 (citing Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963, 968 (Ohio
2002)).
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ysis idea asks similar questions,186 greater clarity in a constitutional
text combined with an opportunity to challenge nominally general
laws creates more flexibility to focus on facts and legislative intent,
rather than a judicial determination of the line between a balance
of power and undue interference.
CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether it is merely a byproduct of the urban disadvantage in the American political system, targeted and vindictive
state preemption of local ordinances is a problem worth addressing. Intrastate preemption represents more than a mere battle of
political wills. Additionally, the problem lies in a state’s ability to
use an open-ended and undefined feature of our governing structure in an unintended way. Understanding the proper place for
state preemption and local home rule requires a greater depth of
thought and attention to consequence than current preemptive efforts tend to express. It may be that we will one day accept politically-motivated state preemption of local laws as a proper expression of the state-local relationship. However, in the absence of
good reasoning for why this should be the case, this Note posits
that the opposite is true: There is value and merit in local action
and autonomy. By reassessing our understanding of and commitment to home rule, it is clear that state constitutions may be better
used to protect the goals of local governance. Likewise, refined judicial inquiries can delve deeper into the motivations of state and
local actors. The goal, in each instance, should be forward movement toward better policy—including policy experimentation,
when needed—and stronger governing structures.

186.

See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND
STATUTES ON HOME RULE AND LOCAL PROTECTIONS
This Appendix provides a qualitative grouping of key home rule
and preemption features of state constitutions, statutes, and some
judicial interpretation. It is not meant to provide a quantitative tally of states as it represents the author’s own interpretations. This
analysis is based upon and gives much credit to the summaries and
excerpts of state constitutions and laws compiled by Professor Paul
Diller for the Legal Effort to Address Preemption (LEAP) project
in May 2017. Unless otherwise noted, all source material comes
from
that
database,
which
can
be
found
at
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
The author also searched from new amendments to state constitutions in 2017 and 2018 using https://ballotpedia.org/. As of
January 13, 2019, there are no new amendments to state constitutions relating to home rule.
TYPE AND STRUCTURE OF HOME RULE
States without Any Form of Constitutional Home Rule
DE, IN, MS

Statutory home rule only
Other Notable States

AL

NJ
VA
VT

Limited statutory home rule for municipalities;
in 2015, a constitutional amendment granted
some powers to counties, but it was not a grant
of home rule power
Statutory home rule; constitution abrogates
Dillon’s Rule
Dillon’s Rule state, but local powers are broadly
interpreted by courts
Dillon’s Rule state

States with Mixed Constitutional/Statutory Home Rule Structures
KS, MA

Constitutional home rule for cities; statutory
home rule for counties
UT
County home rule is more limited and statutory;
municipal home rule is constitutional
Non-Operative Constitutional Home Rule or Non-Self Executing
Constitutional Home Rule Provisions
In these states, the constitution provides for or demands that the
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legislature create mechanisms to provide for local home rule but
does not provide home rule power.
CT, GA, KY, NV, NH, ND
NH

Notable State
New Hampshire can be categorized as a Dillon’s
Rule state. The constitution provides that the
state legislature can allow localities to choose
their form of government from the types defined
by statute.
Level of Home Rule Units

This table distinguishes between municipalities and local units
smaller than counties. Some states do not provide home rule to all
of these units. For example, a state may provide for home rule for
cities but not villages. These categorizations are based on states’
constitutions’ terminology, and individual states’ definitions may
vary.
County Home
AR, KY, MD, WV
Rule Only
City/Municipal AZ, ME, NE, NH, OK, RI, TX, WI, WY
Home Rule
Only
Either and/or
CA, FL, ID, IL, IA, MI, MS, MO, NV, NC, ND,
Both County
OR, PA, TN, UT, WA
and Municipal
Home Rule
Notable States
GA

KS

MA
NJ
NY
OH

SD

County has constitutional home
rule, constitution authorizes state
legislature to provide for
municipal home rule
Cities have constitutional home
rule, counties have statutory
home rule
County home rule is very limited
County home rule is more limited
than municipal home rule
County home rule is very limited
Municipal home rule can be
interpreted as having greater
power
Law also provides for chartered
government that combine cities
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and counties
UT

County home rule is more limited
and statutory; municipal home
rule is constitutional
Note: In a few states where both counties and localities can
exercise home rule powers, courts have held that local ordinances
can
supersede
or
exempt
localities
from
county
ordinance/control. These states include: IA, IL, KS, and OK. The
opposite is true in FL.
AK, CT
Home rule provisions include
Other Home
“boroughs,” in addition to cities
Rule Units
HI
Each political subdivision can be
a home rule unit. In Hawaii,
political subdivisions are islands.
LA
Home rule for “any local
subdivisions” that adopts a charter
MN, MT
Home rule for any “local
government unit” that adopts a
charter
IMMUNITIES, PROTECTIONS, AND
PROHIBITIONS RELATED TO HOME RULE
Examples of States with General Law Requirements
FL
GA

MD

MA

MN

Limited generality requirement: chartered counties
cannot be preempted by “special” (targeted) law.
Constitution contains a uniformity clause prohibiting
local laws where “provision has been made by an existing general law.” However, there is no known case law
challenging a preemptive state law on these grounds.
Constitution prohibits a law targeting Baltimore or any
specific county. However, a law applicable to two or
more counties is not considered a local or targeted
law.
Constitution requires general laws, but there are exceptions to the requirement: 1) a law is general if it
applies to three or more local units, and 2) voters or
local office holders can petition for special laws, as well
as in a few other circumstances.
Very detailed requirement. Prohibits targeted or special laws on a variety of subjects but permits special
laws with permission of the affected unit(s). Generality
is prescribed as a judicial determination: “Whether a
general law could have been made applicable in any
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case shall be judicially determined without regard to
any legislative assertion on that subject.” MINN. CONST.
art. XII, § 1.
RI
State can pass general laws affecting local powers, although laws affecting the structure of local government
are not permitted. Special laws are permitted if approved by voters in the affect local unit.
NH
Not quite a general law requirement: The legislature
cannot change the charter or form of government of a
local unit without approval from voters of the unit.
NJ
Not quite a generality requirement, but the legislature
can only enact special or local laws with approval from
voters or the local governing body in the affected unit.
NY
General law requirement; special laws only when requested by local governments, with separate rules for
New York City.
TN
Constitution prohibits special laws to remove local officers and special laws affecting a local unit, unless approved by the governing body or voters of the affected
unit.
TX
Strong constitutional general law requirement, however it has not been used to challenge preemption laws.
States that Prohibit Local Action that Conflicts with State Law
Local law
cannot conflict with state
law
Local law
cannot conflict with general state laws

FL, HI, IN, IA, ID, KS, KY, LA, MD, MA, ME, MT,
NE, NH, NJ, NY, NC, OH, PA, TX, UT, WA, WV

AR, CT, GA, SC, TN
AL,
DE
MI
MS
NV
NM

OK
RI

Judicial interpretation; state statute does
not specify “general” law
“General law” is used inconsistently in the
constitution and statute
“General law” is only used for counties,
not municipalities
Term used in case law; state statute does
not specify “general” law
Municipal governments can act except
where “expressly denied by general law
or charter”
Judicial interpretation; state statute does
not specify “general” law
Judicial interpretation; state statute does
not specify “general” law
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SD

Home rule entity can take any action not
denied by the general laws of the state
WI
Local law cannot conflict with “any enactment of the legislature which is of
statewide concern and which uniformly
affects every county”
WY
Local law cannot conflict with uniform
state law
States Where Localities Have Any Form of Protection from
Preemption (Excluding General Law Requirements)
AZ, CA, CO, CT, FL, HI, KS, LA, ME, MD, MN, MO, NE, NM, ND,
OH, OK, PA, RI, TN
Notable State
OR

Courts have adopted a presumption against implied
(field) preemption; see supra note 151-52 and accompanying text.
States Where the Right to Home Rule Depends on the Size of a
Municipality
AK, CO, DE, IL, KY, MO, NE, PA, TX, WA
States with “Liberally Construed” Provisions
AK, CO, IL, KS, KY, ME, MI, MT, NJ, NY, NM, NC, ND, OR, PA,
SC, SD, WV, WY
State Law Provides that Enumeration of Local Powers Does Not
Limit Them
IN, IA, OH, UT, TN, VA

